KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Federal Public Service FINANCE

General Administration of the Treasury

Federal Government Debt

Annual Report 2010

BELGIAN DEBT AGENCY

.be

2010 ANNUAL REPORT

Federal Public Service Finance
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BELGIAN
DEBT AGENCY

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FOREWORD BY DIDIER REYNDERS

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

2010 was characterised by a worldwide economic recovery which benefited Belgium, whose GDP growth stands at +2.1%. Following negative growth in 2009, this positive result comes from the increase in exports and domestic consumption, reflecting the renewed confidence of economic actors in general.

The public finances also benefited from this improvement in the economic situation. Thus, the government deficit stands at 4.1% of GDP for 2010, an improvement of 1.8% of GDP compared with the deficit recorded in 2009 (5.9% of GDP). This improvement results from an increase in total revenue and a reduction in total expenditure for the government. Primary expenditure, i.e. expenditure excluding the interest burden, also fell, resulting in a reduction in the primary balance deficit. This fell from -2.3% to -0.7% of GDP between 2009 and 2010.

Belgium's debt ratio increased due to the rescuing of certain financial institutions hit head-on by the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. The increase in this ratio, which rose from 96.2% of GDP in 2009 to 96.8% of GDP in 2010, was, however considerably lower than that forecast in the stability programme, in particular due to more active debt management. The stability programme had envisaged that the debt ratio would exceed the threshold of 100% of GDP in 2010.

Interest rates remained at low levels on the financial markets, influenced by the continuation of the European Central Bank's monetary policy. This situation enabled the continuation of the lowering of the weighted average interest rate of the Federal Government debt – which stood at 4.30% in 2008, 3.68% in 2009 and 3.51% in 2010. The interest burden on the debt decreased slightly in relation to GDP, falling from 3.6% to 3.4% of GDP in 2010.

In a context made more difficult by the financial situation (sovereign debt crisis) the Debt Agency, within the framework of the general directives that I determine each year, succeeded in borrowing the resources necessary to meet our financing requirements at the lowest possible cost. I thank the Agency's personnel for the work accomplished and for everything that will be done to meet the challenges to come.

The Minister of Finance,

Didier Reynders

KEY INDICATORS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT

(EUR bn or % at 31st December)

	2010	2009
I. Amounts outstanding of the main federal government debt instruments		
1. Gross federal debt outstanding	341.61	321.84
- Treasuring financing and investments	0.50	0.00
- Financing of other entities	2.92	2.46
- Portfolio stocks	11.44	3.80
- Investment reserve	0.01	0.04
- Financing of Securities Regulation Fund	0.00	0.01
Net federal debt outstanding	326.74	315.53
2. Debt instruments		
A. Instruments in EUR:	341.49	321.28
- Linear bonds (OLOs)	257.80	241.65
- EMTN in EUR	1.33	0.23
- Conventional loans	0.05	0.05
- State notes	3.95	4.73
- Treasury certificates	40.40	40.14
- Treasury Bonds - Silver Fund	17.63	16.90
- "Belgian Treasury Bills" in EUR	1.69	0.46
- Private loans, interbank loans, etc.	13.01	12.65
- Debt issued in foreign currencies and swapped in EUR (including EMTN)	5.22	4.03
- Borrowings of certain organisations for which the federal government helps service the debt	0.41	0.45
As % of the debt in EUR:		
- Linear bonds	75.49 %	75.21 %
- Conventional loans	0.01 %	0.02 %
- State notes	1.16 %	1.47 %
- Treasury certificates	11.83 %	12.49 %
- Others	11.51 %	10.74 %
B. Instruments in foreign currency:	0.12	0.56
- Long- and medium-term debt	0.00	0.56
- "Belgian Treasury Bills" in foreign currency	0.12	0.00
II. Changes in net federal government debt outstanding over the year		
1. Change (EUR bn)	12.06	12.69
- Net balance to be financed	11.15	7.77
- Borrowings taken over	0.04	4.27
- Exchange gain/loss	0.18	0.09
- Interest capitalised	0.73	0.72
- Miscellaneous	0.00	0.00
- Borrowings of certain organisations	-0.04	-0.16
2. Change (%)	3.53 %	3.94 %

	2010	2009
III. Characteristics of the federal government debt		
1. Ratings issued by the various rating agencies		
- Rating of long-term issues (S&P/Moody's/Fitch)	AA+/Aa1/AA+	AA+/Aa1/AA+
- Outlook (S1P/Mood's/Fitch)	negative/stable/stable	stable/stable/stable
2. Breakdown by currency		
- Borrowings in EUR	99.96 %	99.83 %
- Borrowings in foreign currencies	0.04 %	0.17 %
3. Breakdown by maturity		
- Long and medium term (>1 year)	85.39 %	85.32 %
- Short term	14.61 %	14.68 %
4. Breakdown by rate		
- Fixed rate	84.65 %	80.04 %
- Variable rate	15.35 %	19.06 %
5. Effective duration of the debt in EUR	4.83	3.89
Effective duration of the debt in foreign currencies	0.04	0.10
6. Federal government interest rate burden	11.21	11.58
7. Weighted average interest rate	3.51 %	3.68 %
8. Ratio of federal interest cost to federal expenditure (in %)	21.51 %	24.41 %
IV. Transition from federal debt (Treasury) to general government debt		
1. Federal debt outstanding	341.61	321.84
2. Outstanding debt of other federal entities (1)	4.41	4.39
3. Debt of Communities, Regions and local authorities	42.59	38.75
4. Consolidation adjustment	47.84	38.89
5. Other corrections	0.25	0.28
6. Consolidated general government debt (1+2+3-4+5)	341.02	326.37
7. GDP	352.32	339.16
8. General government debt ratio (6/7)	96.79 %	96.23 %

(1) Debt represented by financial instruments as understood for purposes of the Maastricht Treaty

BELGIAN DEBT AGENCY

PART 1

PART 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMY AND IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN 2010

1. Developments in the Belgian economy and interest rates

Belgian economy

In a context of a general recovery internationally, an increase in exports and a recovery of domestic demand, the growth in activity in Belgium is estimated at 2.1% for all of 2010. These results were obtained after a 2.7% fall in GDP in 2009. GDP growth reached a maximum annual rate of 2.7% in the second quarter and stabilised at around 2% for the remainder of the year.

The initial impulse came from an increase in foreign demand, to the benefit of Belgian exporters. Belgian exports increased by 10.2% in the year under review. This was followed by an improvement of 1.4% in household spending, thanks to a reduction in the savings rate (17.2% of disposable income compared with 18.3% in 2009), reflecting a renewed confidence among private individuals, buoyed up by the improvement in employment prospects. 2010 was characterised by net employment creation: the increase in domestic employment amounted to 0.6%, which represents a net increase of 28,000 units. The harmonised unemployment rate increased by 0.5 percentage points, increasing to 8.4% of the active population, essentially due to the growth in the number of people seeking employment.

The recovery of Belgian activity during the year under review occurred in the wake of an estimated 5% growth worldwide and estimated growth of 1.7% in the eurozone. This strengthening in activity occurred due to the effect of accommodating economic policies and a calming of financial tensions, which generated a recovery in worldwide demand.

After having been zero in 2009, inflation increased in 2010 due to rising prices for energy and food products. Measured on the basis of the harmonised consumer price index, inflation stood at 2.3%.

Interest rates

Short-term interest rates in the eurozone and in the United States remained at historically low levels, influenced by the accommodating monetary policies of the central banks, which held their key interest rates at floor levels. There was, however, a slight increase in these rates in the eurozone.

The public debt crisis encountered by some Governments in the eurozone, coupled with the fluctuating economic prospects in the United States, affected long-term interest rates. Despite the fact that long-term rates in the United States and in most of the eurozone remained at very low levels, yield curves maintained a distinctly positive slope. There was a downward trend in the second and third quarters, due to an economic slowdown in the United States and investors' preference for the best-rated bonds in the eurozone, but an improvement in economic prospects generated a recovery toward the end of the year. Long-term bond rates increased substantially, however, for European countries in a fragile financial situation.

United States

In 2010, growth in the United States once again moved into positive territory, essentially due to the recovery in domestic demand, partly driven by economic policy measures. For the year under review as a whole, the increase in GDP is estimated at 2.8%. This recovery was not as vigorous as desired and stalled during the year, partly due to the situation in the employment and real estate markets.

Although it terminated several measures taken in the context of the crisis, the Federal Reserve continued an accommodating monetary policy in 2010. The federal funds target rate therefore remained within the range of 0% to 0.25% adopted at the end of 2008.

Long-term rates fluctuated in line with economic prospects, reaching a maximum in April and a minimum in October, before recovering over the last two months of the year.

G1. Averages of 3-month interest rates (in %) and averages of yields from 10-year benchmark bonds in 2010



G2. Changes in interest rates (in %) in 2010 (eurozone)



Eurozone

While phasing out some unconventional measures at the beginning of the year, the European Central Bank (ECB) continued its accommodating monetary policy. The central key rate was therefore maintained unchanged at 1% in 2010. In addition, reacting to the tensions on the public securities markets of several eurozone countries, in May the ECB established a secondary market bond purchasing programme to preserve the monetary policy transmission mechanism. On the monetary market, the non-renewal of the Eurosystem six- and twelve-month refinancing operations reduced the excess liquidity and pushed short-term rates slightly upwards.

The uncertainties generated by the public finances situation of certain countries caused a substantial increase in long-term interest rate disparities within the eurozone. Bond rates for the best-rated Governments largely followed rate trends in the United States, while occasionally being pushed downwards by a “flight to quality”. Yield spreads to Germany increased particularly in May, during the Greek public debt crisis, and in November, during the Irish crisis.

Belgium

On the Belgian financial markets, short-term rates followed an upward trend, like those of the eurozone, although remaining at relatively low levels. On average, 3-month Treasury certificate rates on the secondary market therefore rose from 0.31% in January to 0.71% in December. Interbank rates also remained very low, due to the influence of the Eurosystem monetary policy. The 3-month Euribor rose, on average, from 0.68% in January to 1.02% in December.

With regard to the long term, the 10-year benchmark OLO rate oscillated, on average, around 3.5% over the year, ending at 3.99% in December 2010. The difference by comparison with the benchmark German Bund yield remained at around 50 basis points over the first five months of the year, before increasing to around 100 basis points on average in December, approximately mid-way between the comparative differences for France and Italy.

2. Government finance: developments in 2010

According to the National Accounts Institute (ICN) data for March 2011, the Belgian general government's accounts for 2010 closed with a deficit equivalent to 4.1% of GDP. This is an improvement of 1.8 percentage point of GDP over the deficit recorded in 2009 (5.9% of GDP). The results are also more favourable than the target set in the stability programme in January 2010, which envisaged a deficit of 4.8% of GDP for the year under review.

Several factors contributed to the improvement in the financing balance: the budgetary consolidation and monitoring measures implemented at all levels of government, more sustained economic growth than forecast, and the disappearance of exceptional factors that had affected the 2009 budget results.

As is customary, the 2010-2011 budget was drawn up by the government based on the economic budget of September 2009. This was founded on the assumption of a gradual recovery of economic activity, with a growth in GDP of 0.4% for the whole of 2010.

The January 2010 stability programme took account of the impact of a more favourable economic situation, based on an estimated growth of 1.1%, and revised the targets set in the initial budget. The estimated growth was subsequently revised upwards to take account of the strengthening recovery in activity. According to the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) data of February 2011, GDP increased by 2.1% in 2010.

In 2009, the public finances had been negatively influenced by two legal decisions involving tax refunds (the Cobelfret ruling and the judgement concerning discrimination against married unemployed people compared with those who are cohabiting) and by the acceleration of enrolment for personal income tax. Although enrolment accelerated again in 2010, the rate of acceleration was more moderate than in the previous year.

In addition, according to the NBB 2010 annual report, the structural balance improved by 0.9% of GDP compared with the previous year, given the compositional effects in the growth in GDP. In fact, the increase in certain components of individual income and expenditure which are an important determining factor for the public finances (in particular, household spending and earned income) was not as high as the increase in economic activity.

Developments in the different sub-sectors

The general government deficit breaks down into a 3.2% deficit in Entity I (Federal authorities and Social Security) and a 0.9% deficit in Entity II (Communities, Regions and Local Authorities). The results are therefore more favourable than the objectives set in the stability programme for Entity I, and meet the objectives set for Entity II.

Within Entity I, the Federal Government's deficit represents 3.1% of GDP, while that of the Social Security system represents 0.1% of GDP, taking account of the special Federal Government appropriation to Social Security. These results are better than the objectives set for these two sub-sectors.

With regard to Entity II, the accounts for Communities and Regions show a deficit of 0.7% of GDP, while the deficit in Local Authority accounts stands at 0.2% of GDP. The results at the Communities and Regions level were therefore slightly less favourable than the objectives, while they were better at the Local authorities level.

T1. Financing balance objectives and achievements (as a % of GDP[1])

	2009 Achievements	2010 Objectives	2010 Estimates
General government	-5.9	-4.8	-4.1
Entity I	-5.0	-3.8	-3.2
Federal authorities	-4.2	-3.3	-3.1
Social security	-0.8	-0.5	-0.1
Entity II	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9
Communities and Regions	-0.1	-0.6	-0.7
Local Authorities	-0.1	-0.4	-0.2

1 Due to rounding off the totals may differ slightly from the sum of the parts.

Revenue and expenditure

General and special tax revenues showed a slight increase, rising from 42.9% of GDP in 2009 to 43.4% of GDP in 2010. The increase related to the main categories of tax revenues (corporation tax, VAT and registration taxes), while revenue from social security contributions fell by 0.2% of GDP. VAT revenue particularly benefited from the recovery in household spending and exports.

There was a slight reduction in the ratio of withholdings on earned income as a proportion of GDP, due to the reduction of the share of this income in GDP. Revenue from social security contributions fell as a result of this reduction and the exemption from charges on salary rises provided for in the 2009-2010 multi-industry agreement. Revenue from personal income taxes, on the other hand, increased by 0.2% of GDP. This is explained by the partial suppression of the fixed-sum reduction in the Flemish Region and by the rate of acceleration in enrolment for personal income tax, which was lower than that for the previous year. On the other hand, the other tax measures, in particular the aforementioned exemption from charges, contributed to reducing the tax pressure.

Revenues not originating from general and special taxes increased by 0.2 per cent of GDP, mainly thanks to the contributions resulting from the interventions in favour of the financial sector (shareholding dividends, bank guarantees and the deposits and insurance products guarantee system) and the increases in dividends from the NBB.

After seeing a substantial increase in 2009, primary expenditure fell back by 0.8 per cent of GDP, totalling 49.6% of GDP.

This decline was due, in particular, to the reduction in unemployment benefit expenditure. Although the number of fully unemployed people receiving benefit continued to increase, the number of temporary unemployed people reduced considerably, due to a faster reaction to the turnaround in the economy. The rise in the health index was also less than that in the price index used to deflate expenditure, given the lag inherent in the mechanism for indexing public sector pay and social security benefits.

The growth in social security expenditure was also more limited than that for the previous year. Although all expenditure categories were involved, those relating to healthcare contributed most strongly to this slowdown. Pensions expenditure was also reduced, due to the small rise in new beneficiaries coupled with a lesser amount being devoted to readjustment measures. On the other hand, subsidies granted to companies (exemptions from withholding tax on professional income and service vouchers expenditure) increased.

T2. General government revenue and expenditure (as % of GDP)

	2009 Achievements	2010 Estimates
Total revenue	48.1	48.9
of which general tax revenue		
and special tax revenue	42.9	43.4
Primary expenditure	50.4	49.6
Total expenditure	54.0	53.0

The combination of revenue and primary expenditure gives rise to a reduction in the primary balance deficit from 2.3% to 0.7% of GDP. This result is better than the objective stated in the stability programme for a primary balance deficit of 1.1% of GDP.

The interest burden on public debt represented 3.4% of GDP, a fall of 0.2 per cent of GDP by comparison with 2009. This reduction is exclusively attributable to the reduction in the implicit interest rate for both short-term and long-term debt.

The government debt ratio continued to increase in 2010, representing 96.8% of GDP, compared with 96.2% of GDP for the previous year. The rate of increase in the debt ratio was, however, substantially more moderate than for 2009, when the ratio increased by 6.6 per cent of GDP. The rise is also lower than the objective stated in the stability programme, which forecast that the debt ratio would exceed the threshold of 100% of GDP in 2010. The improvement is due to more favourable budget results than initially forecast and to active management of the public debt.

European comparison

The Belgian financing balance (-4.1% of GDP) is more favourable than the financing balance of the eurozone Member States, which is an average deficit of 6.0% of GDP. The primary balance result also demonstrated better performance. This amounted to -0.7% of GDP, compared with a eurozone average of -3.2% of GDP. In addition, although at a relatively high level, the increase in the Belgian debt ratio (0.6 percentage point of GDP) is one of the lowest of all the eurozone countries.

G3. Trend in the debt ratio from 1990 to 2010 (in % of GDP)



G4. Primary balance and financing balance (% of GDP)



G5. European financing balance comparison (% of GDP)



G6. European gross consolidated debt comparison (% of GDP)



PART 2

BELGIAN DEBT AGENCY

PART 2. FINANCING POLICY IN 2010

1. Financing requirements and resources in 2010

In 2010, the Federal Government's gross financing requirements totalled EUR 43.49 billion.

The federal cash shortfall in the strict sense amounted to EUR 10.68 billion, whereas the Treasury initially expected a cash shortfall of EUR 14.10 billion. The unexpected improvement in the Federal government's budget results was therefore immediately translated into a lowering of financing requirements. In addition, the Treasury posted a very positive result from the swaps concluded in 2009 and earlier. Thanks to the cancellation of swaps, the Treasury received a total amount of EUR 2.16 billion in 2010. However, the Treasury had to provide resources for Greece's financing. Finally, the cash shortfall in the broad sense amounted to EUR 11.15 billion, substantially lower than the sum envisaged in the initial budget.

The Treasury was also obliged to reimburse an amount of EUR 25.87 billion for long-term debts. It also bought back a much larger amount of bonds maturing in 2011 (EUR 6.46 billion) than had initially been envisaged (EUR 2.83 billion). The Treasury also issued considerably more Linear bonds (OLOs) than envisaged, and the additional revenue was used in large part to prefinance 2011. This allowed the 2011 calendar of maturities to be lightened to some extent.

T3. Treasury financing in 2010 (EUR bn)

	Financing plan (1)		Situation on 31/12/2010	
I. Gross 2010 financing balance		**42.78**		**43.49**
1. <u>Budget deficit:</u>		<u>14.10</u>		<u>11.15</u>
- Budget deficit (strictly defined)	14.10		10.68	
- Transfers to the Silver Fund	0.00		0.00	
- Participation in financial institutions and sovereign states	0.00		0.48	
2. <u>Debt maturing in 2010</u>		<u>25.85</u>		<u>25.87</u>
- Medium- and long-term debt in EUR	25.29		25.26	
- Medium- and long-term debt in foreign currencies	0.56		0.61	
3. <u>Pre-financing of bonds maturing in 2011</u>		<u>2.83</u>		<u>6.46</u>
- Buybacks	2.83		6.46	
4. <u>Other financing requirements</u>		<u>0.00</u>		<u>0.01</u>
II. 2010 financing resources		**39.32**		**45.30**
1. <u>Medium- and long-term EUR issues</u>		<u>34.82</u>		<u>42.65</u>
- Linear bonds	32.75		40.85	
- Treasury Bonds - Silver Fund	1.57		1.57	
- Instruments for private investors	0.50		0.22	
- Miscellaneous	0.00		0.00	
2. <u>Medium- and long-term foreign-currency issues</u>		<u>4.50</u>		<u>2.66</u>
III. Net change in foreign-currency short-term debt		**-0.40**		**-0.02**
IV. Change in Treasury certificate amount outstanding		**1.49**		**0.27**
V. Net change in other short-term debt and financial assets		**2.37**		**-2.07**

The total medium and long-term financing resources amounted to EUR 45.30 billion, which was greater than the sum envisaged (EUR 39.32 billion). The Treasury issued Linear bonds (OLOs) for a total of EUR 40.85 billion. Then, as had been provided for, an amount of EUR 1.57 billion was refinanced in “Treasury bonds – Silver Fund”. The revenue from State notes (EUR 0.22 billion) and instruments within the EMTN programme (EUR 2.66 billion) was once again lower than envisaged.

The amount of medium and long-term issues finally turned out to be higher than the financing requirements, so that short-term net debt decreased by EUR 1.82 billion on an annual basis. However, Treasury certificates outstanding remained virtually stable, and this decrease therefore showed its effects in terms of interbank debts and other debts, adjusted for changes in investment. This result reflected the strategy implemented by the Treasury of lengthening the duration of the portfolio.

2. An issuing policy based on two types of products

2.1. Liquid products issued on a transparent basis to a predictable pattern

a. Linear bonds (OLOs)

In 2010, the Treasury issued OLOs for a total amount of EUR 40.85 billion, almost EUR 6 billion more than in 2009. On each occasion, it made use of the syndication technique for launching its three new benchmark bonds. During the year under review, the Treasury also organised 8 auctions, out of the 11 initially scheduled in the financing plan. The auctions were cancelled for the months in which the 3 syndications were held.

Syndications - OLO 58

Continuing the tradition of issuing a bond with a 10-year maturity date in January, the Treasury launched the syndication of a new benchmark bond, the OLO 58. The Treasury’s aim was to add a new 10-year benchmark product to its curve.

The OLO 58, with a final maturity date of 28 September 2020, was placed by a syndicate, with the primary dealers BNP Paribas Fortis, Calyon, HSBC and RBS as joint lead managers. Other primary dealers and recognized dealers also participated in the placement, as co-lead managers and members of the selling group, respectively. Orders flowed in quickly, reaching EUR 5.5 billion in two hours, and continued to rise to EUR 8 billion from 207 investors by the afternoon closure. The quality of the orders enabled the Treasury to conclude a transaction for a final amount of EUR 5 billion.

The transaction was launched in a positive market environment with a demand for long-term borrowing.

The issue spread was set at mid-swap + 30 basis points, equivalent to +54.3 basis points above the “Bund January 2020” and 33.1 basis points above the OAT October 2019. The orders came essentially from “real money” investors and were therefore of excellent quality. This OLO's coupon was set at 3.75% and the issue price at 99.032%, equivalent to a yield of 3.864%.

Once again, the Treasury used the technique known as “mixed pot” syndication to allocate orders. As in previous syndications, this system contributed to improving the efficiency, transparency and objectivity of both the book-building process and the allocation itself. An in-depth check was conducted on the majority of the subscriptions, thereby avoiding duplication of subscriptions from investors working with several primary dealers.

28% of the placement of the OLO 58 was made in Europe outside the eurozone. But the most substantial share was placed in the eurozone (67%), of which approximately 18% in Belgium. In total, the orders were allocated to 195 different investors.

Syndication

Syndication is an issuing technique whereby the Treasury makes use of a syndicate of primary and recognised dealers to issue and place its securities. The syndicate is a temporary association of banks, whose common objective is collective placement of the bonds. There are three levels within the syndicate:

1. Lead manager: this is the bank that receives a mandate from the issuer to lead the syndicate. The lead manager underwrites the placement of most of the bonds, and is responsible for the overall coordination and organisation of the issue. In liaison with the issuer, it determines the structure, volume, spread and timing of the operation. Where several lead managers handling the issue, they are called joint lead managers.

2. Co-lead manager: works one level below the lead manager. Manages a small share of the placement.

3. Selling Group: this is the lowest level in the syndication structure. In the case of Belgium, the selling group is made up of the recognized dealers. They are invited to participate, but do not have to underwrite their participation. This participation is limited to placing a small volume of securities. They do not have any other tasks or responsibilities.

Mixed pot syndication

In the case of a mixed pot syndication structure, as in normal pot syndication, the Treasury has the advantage of total transparency regarding the identity of the buyer. However, there are two differences compared with normal pot syndication:

1. The presence of a blind retention reserved for the co-lead managers and the selling group. They are guaranteed this portion of the OLO allocation without the need to divulge the identity of the buyer to the joint lead managers. The co-lead managers and the selling group are, respectively, primary dealers other than joint lead managers, and the recognised dealers. The blind retention is granted to them by the Treasury in return for their efforts in placing the OLOs and Treasury certificates over the course of the previous year.

2. The presence of a strategic reserve. A fraction of the debt issue is reserved for the allocation of certain purchase orders presented by the co-leads and the selling group. In allocating the strategic reserve, the Debt Agency strives to allocate the orders placed by the co-leads and the selling group members on the basis of the following criteria: 1. the order is placed by an investor who is not yet registered in the books of the lead managers; 2. the order is of excellent quality and represents true diversification or is placed by an investor whose loyalty the Agency is particularly keen to secure.

G7. Geographical distribution of OLO 58 (3.75 % - 28/09/2020)



G9. Geographical distribution of OLO 59 (2.75 % - 28/03/2016)



G8. Distribution of OLO 58 by investor type (3.75 % - 28/09/2020)



G10. Distribution of OLO 56 by investor type (2.75 % - 28/03/2016)



OLO 59

For the second syndication of the year, the Treasury continued its 2010 issue programme by launching a “long 5-year” product in March. This type of maturity was chosen to properly integrate the existing OLO curve. This syndicated benchmark was launched in an environment where market feeling and spreads were continuously improving, and where Belgium remained fairly stable despite the existence of a certain volatility in the sovereign debt markets on the periphery.

OLO 59, with a final maturity of 28 March 2016 and a coupon of 2.75%, was issued at a price of 99.84%, equivalent to a yield of 2.778%, at mid-swap + 8 basis points, which corresponds to a cost of 38.1 basis points above the German “Bund January 2016” bond. The spread above the OAT April 2016 was 13.9 basis points.

The Treasury selected the following four primary dealers as lead managers for this syndication: Barclays, ING, Société Générale and UBS. The other primary dealers and recognised dealers also participated in the placement, as co-lead managers and members of the selling group, respectively. Placement orders totalled EUR 5 billion for 139 investors. The final amount allocated totalled EUR 4 billion.

The Treasury also used the mixed pot syndication technique to allocate orders. This system contributed to improving the efficiency, transparency and objectivity of both the book-building process and the allocation itself. In this case, it afforded the Treasury better control over orders allocated outside Belgium.

In terms of geographical distribution, 28% was placed in Europe outside the eurozone and 47% within the eurozone, of which some 12% in Belgium. With regard to distribution by investor, the Treasury gave particular preference to “real money” accounts.

OLO 60

For the third and last syndication of the year, the Treasury launched a 30-year OLO (OLO 60) in April. The Treasury has not issued such a long-term OLO since the launch of OLO 44 in 2004. The old 30-year benchmark had not been reopened for 2 years. This new 30-year bond therefore made it possible to complete the OLO curve. Inquiries with investors had identified their interest in a 30-year maturity. This was also the first sovereign issue with such a maturity in the eurozone in 2010.

OLO 60, with a final maturity of 28 March 2041 and a coupon of 4.25%, was issued at a price of 99.615, equivalent to a yield of 4.2730%, at mid-swap + 58 basis points, which corresponds to a cost of 38.7 basis points above the German “Bund July 2040” bond.

The Treasury selected the following four primary dealers as lead managers for this syndication: Barclays, BNP, Paribas Fortis, JP Morgan and Société Générale. The other primary dealers and recognised dealers also participated in the placement, as co-lead managers and members of the selling group, respectively. Orders totalled EUR 6.2 billion for 127 investors. The final amount allocated totalled EUR 4 billion.

As for the two previous syndications, the Treasury made use of the mixed pot system to allocate the orders.

More than 46% of the orders were placed in Europe outside the eurozone and 48% within the eurozone, of which only 5% in Belgium. With regard to distribution by investor, the majority of bids were allocated to fund managers, financial institutions and pension funds.

G11. Geographical distribution of OLO 60 (4.25 % - 28/03/2041)



G12. Distribution of OLO 60 by investor type (4.25 % - 28/03/2041)



The Treasury appointed a duration manager for each of these three syndications. The function of a duration manager is to stabilise the market when the issue price of the new OLO is set, by acting as the counterpart for all switch orders placed by the investors in the book, among other roles. Switch orders are purchase orders for the new OLO on condition that another security is sold simultaneously at a pre-determined minimum price. This orderly and efficient organisation of investors’ selling orders is intended to limit erratic movements in the market when the new OLO is priced.

OLO auctions

The Treasury decided in 2009 to increase the frequency of OLO auctions. From then on, they took place every month instead of every two months. This rule did not change for 2010. There were two reasons for this decision: on the one hand, as in 2009, the economic and financial crisis was causing uncertainty with regard to the amount to be collected during the auctions, and on the other hand, account had to be taken of the volume to be financed in 2010, namely more than EUR 30 billion.

This was achieved, in practical terms, by organising an OLO auction on the last Monday of the month, except for December. The calendar was, however, modified slightly by postponing the May auction by one week and bringing forward the August auction by one week. The Treasury therefore took account of public holidays in the United States and the United Kingdom which happened to fall on the last Monday in the month.

The Treasury also has the possibility of cancelling an auction when there is a syndication in the month concerned. This occurred in January, March and April when OLO 58, 59 and 60 were launched, bringing in a total of EUR 13 billion. There were therefore 8 auctions, which together brought in EUR 27.85 billion (EUR 22.45 billion during the competitive round and EUR 5.40 billion for non-competitive subscriptions).

The issuance calendar, which is published each year in December, does not indicate the OLO line types to be auctioned in the next year, nor the number of lines. This data is disclosed one week before the auction, following consultation with the primary dealers. At the consultation meeting, the Treasury and the primary dealers review in detail the market demand and circumstances in order to take a decision on which lines should be auctioned.

Three lines were proposed on each occasion during six OLO auctions. Only two lines were proposed in the July auction, in view of the holiday period and the success of the two auctions in June.

Following the May auction, which actually took place on 7 June due to public holidays in the United States and the United Kingdom, the Treasury offered 4 OLO lines for the June auction. Apart from OLO 50 (28/03/2013), OLO 59 (28/03/2016) and OLO 58 (28/09/2020), the Treasury also proposed OLO 31, with a final maturity of 28 March 2028, in response to a request from insurance companies.

The new 10-year benchmark (OLO 58), which was launched in January, was offered and demanded at each auction so that the initial amount of EUR 5 billion increased to reach a total amount in circulation of EUR 17.63 billion.

OLO 59, which was issued in March, was also subsequently offered on 5 occasions during the auctions, increasing the amount outstanding from EUR 4.0 billion to 9.59 billion.

In April 2010, the Treasury issued a new 30-year bond, OLO 60, with a final maturity of 28 March 2041. This new benchmark bond was also included in an auction in September, which increased the amount outstanding to EUR 4.82 billion at the end of the year.

Following the August auction, the Treasury had already brought in EUR 31.61 billion via the OLO syndications and auctions, so that the envisaged amount of EUR 33.75 billion for all the OLO issues for the entire year had almost been reached. The Treasury therefore decided to increase the envisaged amount by EUR 3.25 billion to EUR 37 billion. Buy-backs of OLOs maturing in 2011 were increased by EUR 2 billion to EUR 4.83 billion, which increased the prefinancing of 2011.

It should be noted that the Treasury takes account of market demand, which constitutes an important aspect of its strategy. By comparison with 2009, the share of medium and short-term maturities fell from 58.6% to 38.76%. With a relative share of 45.36%, the demand essentially related to the new 10-year benchmark bond. The very long maturities (greater than 10 years) aroused more interest, with a relative share of 15.88% and an amount of EUR 4.42 billion. The figures for 2009 were 12% and EUR 2.48 billion respectively. The demand for long-term borrowing corresponded perfectly to the Treasury's strategy aimed at lengthening the duration.

The average bid-to-cover ratio for all eight auctions was 2.25, compared with 2.63 for 2009 and 1.97 for 2008. The extreme values recorded in 2010 were 1.40 and 3.39. This represents the ratio between the bids and the amounts selected. It is an indicator that makes it possible to see whether the auction is sufficiently covered by the bids, and therefore whether there is enough demand for the securities in the market.

On average, the primary and recognised dealers received the auction results 6.5 minutes after the closure of the deadline for bid submissions. The shortest time was 4 minutes, recorded during the July auction, when two lines were proposed. The other extreme of 9 minutes was recorded during the auction of 7 June.

Non-competitive subscriptions

After the competitive round of auctions, the primary dealers – but not the recognized dealers – are entitled to participate in non-competitive subscriptions.

They acquire this right in return for their active participation in the auctions. They can buy securities at the weighted average auction price, based on a predetermined percentage of their bids accepted in the two previous auctions.

This right to non-competitive subscriptions for all the primary dealers taken together amounted to EUR 6.97 billion, of which 69.83% was exercised (compared with 41.26% in 2009). The exercise of this right depends on the market conditions at the time of the non-competitive round. Up to and including the September auction, the primary dealers made ample use of their right to non-competitive subscriptions, following the increase in prices after the auctions.

These non-competitive subscriptions contributed to facilitating the Treasury's financing during 2010. Due to the increase in rates in the fourth quarter, the primary dealers made scarcely any use of this option to obtain additional OLOs.

Buy-back of linear bonds

Since July 2001, the Treasury has been using the MTS Belgium (MTSB) electronic platform for buy-backs of its bonds, as it offers liquidity, efficiency and transparent pricing. Buy-backs are carried out via a screen (Belgian Buy-Backs - BBB) which only the primary dealers and the Treasury can access, and on which the Treasury continuously displays the purchase prices.

When an OLO line reaches a date less than 12 months prior to its final maturity, the Treasury offers it for buy-back, which enables investors to dispose of their securities early. For the Treasury, buy-backs allow planned interim prefinancing of future OLO maturities.

The Treasury had already begun in 2009 to buy back the OLO 45 (final maturity 28 March 2010) and OLO 35 (final maturity 28 September 2010) lines, as of the months of April and October respectively. Only EUR 70 million of the OLO 45 was bought back during the first two months of 2010, which brought the total amount bought back to EUR 1.53 billion. This represented 17.34% of the total amount issued. In 2009, the Treasury had bought back EUR 1.55 billion of OLO 35. In 2010, the buy-backs on this OLO amounted to EUR 2.9 billion, thus reducing the total amount to be redeemed on maturity to EUR 11.39 billion, a reduction of 28.10%.

The Treasury began the buy-back of OLO 53 (final maturity 28 March 2011) at the end of March 2010, and that of OLO 36 (final maturity 28 September 2011) on 1 October. In 2010, EUR 4.7 billion of OLO 53 was bought back, bringing the amount outstanding to EUR 6.24 billion. With regard to OLO 36, the buy-backs amounted to EUR 1.6 billion for the months of October, November and December, thus bringing the amount outstanding at the end of 2010 to just EUR 10.77 billion.

G13. Distribution of issues by maturity at the 2010 OLO auctions (in billions of EUR)



G14. Bid-to-cover ratio at the 2010 OLO auctions



G15. OLO issues in 2010 distributed by type (in billions of EUR)



T4. Buy-backs conducted by the Treasury in 2010 on a monthly basis

(millions of EUR)	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Total
OLO 32 28/03/2009	20	50											70
OLO 45 28/03/2010	235	325	77		218	1 535	104	210	195				2 899
OLO 35 28/09/2010			123	700	375	596	473	866	740	729	7	138	4 747
OLO 36 28/03/2009										931	238	444	1 613
Total per month	255	375	200	700	593	2 131	577	1 076	935	1 660	245	582	9 329

b. Treasury certificates

In 2010, the end-of-month outstanding amounts of Treasury certificates varied within a range of EUR 39 billion to EUR 44 billion. The amounts outstanding increased at the start of the year, with a view to covering the OLO capital and interest reimbursements in March.

During the year under review, the basic calendar for issues of Treasury certificates remained unchanged compared with the calendar introduced in 2005. The volumes issued in the certificate auctions were adjusted according to needs, but unlike in previous years, the Treasury did not issue Cash Management T-Bills – issues of certificates in addition to the programme of conventional issues – at 1 or 2 months. The front loading of the OLOs ensured sufficient cash positions so that additional "Cash Management T-Bills" issues were not necessary.

Investors continued to show interest in the Treasury certificate auctions, as shown by the bid-to-cover ratio, which represents the number of bids received divided by the number of bids accepted in the auctions.

On average, the bid-to-cover ratio was 3.88 for the 3-month segment, 2.31 for the 6-month and 1.98 for the 12-month. The average amount bid was EUR 3.51 billion for the 3-month segment, EUR 4.24 billion for the 6-month and EUR 3.90 billion for the 12-month.

G16. Outstanding Treasury certificates at end of month in 2010 (in billions of EUR)



G17. Average bid-to-cover ratio for auctions of Treasury certificates in 2010



G18. Weighted average interest rate of Treasury certificates at 3, 6 and 12 months in 2010 (in %)



G19. Issue spreads between the average weighted rate of Treasury certificates and Euribor at 3, 6 and 12 months in 2010 (in basis points)



These ratios remained at comfortable levels, although slightly below those for the previous year.

For the new 12-month lines, the volume after the first auction fluctuated between EUR 1.56 billion and EUR 2.21 billion.

The average difference at auction between the limit rate and the lowest offered rate was 1.7 basis points for 3 months, 2.1 basis points for 6 months and 3.2 basis points for 12 months, representing a slight increase compared with 2009. This is partly due to the substantial volatility in the markets during the year under review.

In addition, 64% of investors on average saw their bids accepted in the 3-month auctions. For the 6- and 12-month segments, the proportions were 79% and 92% respectively.

Graph G19 illustrates the spread between the weighted average rate of Treasury certificates and the Euribor for issues of 3-, 6- and 12-month lines. The average spreads compared with the Euribor for 2010 were -37.6, -56.2 and -52.1 basis points for the 3, 6, and 12-month segments respectively, all to the advantage of the Treasury. The uncertain political climate caused a deterioration in spreads for all terms towards the end of the year, from October onwards.

In 2010, in volume terms the primary dealers availed themselves of 13.5% of their entitlement to obtain Treasury certificates at the weighted average auction rate by means of non-competitive subscriptions. They subscribed to the non-competitive round in 9 of the 28 auctions held throughout the year. It should be borne in mind that the primary dealers' exercise of their entitlement to non-competitive bids depends on the market conditions.

T5. Issues of State notes in 2010

ISSUE OF 4TH MARCH 2010			
	STATE NOTES	COUPON	Total subscribed
	5-year S.N	2.50 %	33 500 000
	8-year S.N	3.25 %	53 700 000
			87 200 000
ISSUE OF 4TH JUNE 2010			
	STATE NOTES	COUPON	Total subscribed
	5-year S.N	2.20 % (101.00)	16 000 000
	8-year S.N	3.00 % (101.50)	29 500 000
			45 500 000
ISSUE OF 4TH SEPTEMBER 2010			
	STATE NOTES	COUPON	Total subscribed
	5-year S.N	2.05 % (100.75)	16 950 000
	8-year S.N	2.75 % (100.75)	19 000 000
			35 950 000
ISSUE OF 4TH DECEMBER 2010			
	STATE NOTES	COUPON	Total subscribed
	5-year S.N	2.35 %	23 300 000
	8-year S.N	3.00 % (99.75)	27 500 000
			50 800 000
	Total 2010		**219 450 000**

c. State notes

For the fifteenth consecutive year, the Belgian government issued State notes.

State notes are fixed-interest medium- and long-term loans in EUR with annual coupons. They are placed through placing institutions bound by contract to the Treasury.

On the primary market, this product is targeted at private investors and certain other investor categories: foundations, non-profit organisations, churches or institutions classified as religious bodies in the national register of legal persons, and entities established in the European Economic Area which are similar to the entities listed above and enjoy the same subscription rights by virtue of community law.

It should be remembered that these securities are issued exclusively in dematerialised form, and savers who still hold bearer securities have until 31 December 2013 at the latest to request their conversion into registered or dematerialised securities.

It should also be noted that it remains possible to opt for a named registration with the Treasury's General Ledger Department, free of charge. The registered form is also possible for purchases on the secondary market.

2010 was characterised by a reduction in rates for the first three issues in March, June and September. The rates subsequently improved slightly for the December issue. Due to this situation, the Treasury issued only 5- and 8-year notes, judging that the rate that could be offered for a 3-year note was insufficiently attractive.

The consequence of these changes in rates was that the amounts issued fell from EUR 87.2 million for the March issue to EUR 35.95 million for the September issue. There was a slight upturn in the volume subscribed for the December issue, which reached EUR 50.8 million.

The total amount of State notes issued during 2010 amounted to EUR 219.45 million.

With regard to the secondary market, the State notes are quoted on the Euronext Brussels continuous market and the liquidity is underwritten by a liquidity provider, Florint BV.

In addition, in order to facilitate liquidation and tax payment, State notes are included in the Belgian National Bank's X/N liquidation system. This system enables an investor exempted from withholding tax on income derived from securities to receive the gross interest amount directly, and conversely allows a non-exempted investor to receive the interest net of withholding tax on income derived from securities.

d. Strips

The outstanding amount of strippable OLOs increased substantially in 2010, rising from EUR 5.3 billion at the end of 2009 to EUR 7.3 billion at the end of 2010. At the end of the year, 3% of the strippable outstanding amount was effectively stripped. At the end of 2010, there were 22 strippable OLOs, of which 8 had a September maturity.

This substantial increase in outstanding stripped securities can be explained by the fact that the primary dealers anticipated the project to create fungibility for OLO zero-coupon securities with the same maturity. This project was begun in the second quarter of 2010, and the market expects it to conclude in 2011.

The consequence of the creation of fungibility between all the zero-coupons with the same maturity, independently of the fact that they initially represent the cash flow from interest or capital, is that the unsold zero-coupons can be more easily converted back into OLOs. The cost of holding zero-coupons in banks' balance sheets can thus be avoided.

The markets' anticipation of the project to create fungibility for strips had an impact on the yield spread between, on the one hand, the zero-coupons that represented the coupons and, on the other, the capital with the same maturity. This spread reduced to a maximum of 2 basis points during 2010.

It should also be noted that the market circumstances were favourable to the development of the OLO strips market. The tightening of the rate curve of the underlying OLOs increased the yield spread between the OLOs and the strips, and this led to certain investors again placing substantial orders for stripped securities.

G20. Change in the net stripped amount on OLOs from January 2009 to December 2010 (in millions of EUR)



G21. OLO splitting and regrouping activity from January 2009 to December 2010 (in millions of EUR)



2.2. Tailor-made products

a. Bond issues within the EMTN programme

Since 2008, the Treasury has the option of financing itself in the long term through instruments other than the traditional OLO programme. To do this efficiently, it set up a Euro Medium Term Notes programme (EMTN) in 2008. This legal documentation makes it possible to issue short-, medium- and long-term loans in all OECD currencies, and also in the form of a series of structured products. This type of issue allows the diversity of the investor base to be increased and, if necessary, reduces pressure on standard OLO issues. In addition, these issues are only conducted if the cost at issue is less than or equal to the cost of an OLO with the same maturity. Of course, the use of these new instruments must not compromise the liquidity of the OLOs. Issues in the EMTN programme must therefore be considered as supplementary to the standard programme.

Given the success of the issues carried out within the EMTN programme in 2009, the Treasury had envisaged possible issues of EUR 4.5 billion under this programme at the beginning of 2010.

Despite the difficulties encountered by some peripheral eurozone countries in issuing during the first quarter of the year, Belgium benefited from a fairly positive climate in the early months, which enabled a number of interesting transactions to be carried out.

The first EMTN issue of the year took place in March for an amount of USD 1.0 billion. This fixed-rate issue with a 2.5% coupon was swapped to a 5-year EUR 742 million loan. This loan was subsequently re-opened twice, each time for an amount of USD 500 million. This proves once again that investors are maintaining their confidence in the solvency of Belgium. It goes without saying that these loans were also converted into EUR. All three loans were placed by a syndicate of banks and were subject to diversified distribution.

The second loan, also launched in March, was an issue in CHF for an amount equivalent to EUR 68 million with a final maturity in 2030. Finally, at the end of the month, the Treasury placed a structured transaction of EUR 700 million with a primary dealer and 2 investors. At the investor's request, this 20-year issue can be extended from 2030 to 2040. For this exceptional transaction, the Debt Agency received a prize from mtn-i, a company based in London and the main provider of data and news about private placements and structured bond loans. This prize was awarded in recognition of the innovative structure of this sovereign bond loan and the volume of the transaction.

The debt crisis in May also naturally affected investor demand for EMTN issues. This market did not open again until September. An amount of EUR 175 million was issued during that month, due to investor interest in long-term transactions. The bond had a final maturity of 28 September 2030 and was issued at a floating rate of 3-month Euribor + 48.5 basis points.

The last transaction of 2010, which was also that with the longest term, was carried out in October. This was for an amount of EUR 220 million, with a final maturity in 2052. An mtn-i prize was also awarded for this issue. With a maturity of 42 years, this debenture loan has the longest term ever issued under an EMTN programme.

In 2010 the Treasury issued a total amount equivalent to EUR 2.644 billion under the EMTN programme, which is less than the initially envisaged envelope of EUR 4.5 billion. There are several reasons why it was difficult to conduct regular issues under this programme: high volatility, the difficult issue climate during the second and third quarters, and the Belgian political crisis.

It should be noted that with the exception of USD transactions, all the issues in the EMTN programme had a maturity greater than or equal to 20 years. This again confirms the interest in Belgian long-term issues, and was consistent with the success achieved by the 30-year OLO issue (OLO 60).

b. "Belgian Treasury Bills" (BTB) in EUR and foreign currencies

The Treasury made use of the commercial paper programme in 2010, with the same objectives as in previous years.

BTBs in euro are issued at times of cash deficit to supplement financing by means of Treasury Certificates. Given that there was little or no cash deficit, the issues in EUR remained limited and were mostly concentrated on the OLO maturities.

The foreign currency debt remained relatively stable. As in the past, the Treasury made use of its BTB programme to finance its foreign currency debt.

G22. Change in outstanding foreign currency BTBs in 2010 (in millions of EUR)



c. Treasury Bonds - Silver Fund

The Silver Fund did not receive any new resources in 2010. Consequently there was no Treasury Bonds - Silver Fund issue during the year under review.

The "Treasury Bonds – Silver Fund" are zero-coupon bonds. The interest, determined at the time of issue based on the OLO rate curve, is capitalised up until the final maturity date. The securities are included in the Government debt and the value recorded takes into account the interest accrued.

Two "Treasury Bonds – Silver Funds" reached final maturity in 2010, which is a first. The Silver Fund replaced the capital and interest reaching maturity with two new "Treasury Bonds – Silver Funds" with final maturities in 2022 and 2023 respectively.

On 31 December 2010, the Silver Fund reserves invested in "Treasury Bonds – Silver Fund" amounted to EUR 17.63 billion and had final maturities ranging from 2011 to 2023.

3. General Directives and control of risks

The General Debt Directives, which the Finance Minister determines each year based on proposals from the Strategic Debt Committee, constitute the guideline for managing the risk underwritten by the Treasury. The Treasury therefore monitors refinancing risk, interest-rate refixing risk, credit risk and exchange risk. The Treasury reports regularly on the status of issues relating to risks.

3.1. Refinancing risk and interest-rate refixing risk

As we know, a major slump hit the world economy at the end of 2008, with well-known negative consequences on public finance. Consequently, in 2009, certain risk parameters relating to refinancing risk and interest-rate refixing risk were adjusted. The objective of these increases was to enable the Treasury to expose its debt to a greater extent in the short- term.

The risk-measurement parameter limits remained at the same levels in 2010 as for 2009.

The maximum 12-month refinancing risk was therefore maintained at 25%, while for 60 months it remained at 62.5%. With regard to interest-rate refixing risk, the limits remained at the same levels as for 2009. The 12-month parameter limit was 32.5% and the 60-month limit was 70%.

The crisis forced the ECB to relax monetary policy, which resulted in a reduction in rates in 2009. The Treasury reacted to this by concluding “receiver swaps” for EUR 15 billion in 2009. When it appeared in 2010 that the low rates were about to end, the Treasury cancelled these swaps and the swaps concluded before 2009 for EUR 7 billion. As a result, it received premiums totalling EUR 2.16 billion.

Although the 12-month interest-rate refixing risk had increased to approximately 31% in the spring of 2010, the result of the swaps cancellation was a substantial reduction in the risk on this segment. At the end of 2010, it stood at just 24.58%.

The same trend was recorded for the 60-month interest-rate refixing risk. At the end of 2009 it stood at 66.50%, compared with 61.16% at the end of 2010.

3.2. Credit risk

Credit risk is determined by the potential loss to the Treasury if one (or more) of its counterparts fails to fulfil their contractual payment obligations. The Treasury's credit-risk management principles remained largely unchanged in 2010. Given that the markets were still experiencing turbulence in 2010, the Treasury maintained its 2008 decision to restrict the volume of credit limits[1] for its counterparts.

(1) The credit limits of Treasury counterparts are calculated based on their equity and rating.

G23. 12-month refinancing risk and interest-rate refixing risk of the euro debt in 2010 (as % of the total)



G24. 60-month refinancing risk and interest-rate refixing risk of the euro debt in 2010 (as % of the total)



In 2010, the Treasury also cancelled six credit lines with counterparts – Irish and Portuguese – given that their rating no longer satisfied the Treasury's minimum requirements[2].

Within the framework of its liquidity management, the Treasury carries out transactions on the interbank market. Cash surpluses are placed with financial counterparts. As for the two previous years, the Treasury decided to use reverse repos only for placements greater than one week, and in general to grant preference to the conclusion of reverse repos for shorter maturities.

For the reverse repo period, the Treasury receives an OLO and/or a Treasury certificate as collateral, which limits the credit risk of these operations. In 2010, an EMA[3] contract with an additional counterpart was concluded for these “repo” operations.

The average daily amount placed by the Treasury in 2010 doubled by comparison with 2009, given that the long-term issues were more substantial during the first months of the year. The share of reverse repos fell slightly from 78% in 2009 to 73% in 2010. The share of normal placements in the average amount placed per day in the same period increased from 22% to 27%. During the months characterised by the highest average amount of cash surplus per day (March and July-September 2010), however, the share of reverse repos remained within a range of 83% to 88%.

On 31 December 2010 the total credit risk on derivative products amounted to EUR 2.2 billion, i.e. a 31% increase compared with the end of the previous year (EUR 1.7 billion). Thanks to the Credit Support Annex agreements (CSA) concluded by the Treasury with all its primary dealers[4], and with some counterparts, the Treasury is partially protected against credit risk. At the end of 2010 it had, in fact, received a guarantee of EUR 1.5 billion (collateral), thanks to which the total net credit risk on derivative products amounted to EUR 0.8 billion. Despite the substantial increase in the total credit risk on derivative products, the net credit risk on derivative products at the end of 2010 remained at the same level as at the end of 2009 (EUR 0.8 billion), thanks to the guarantees received.

The increase in the foreign currency swaps credit risk (before collateral) was caused by the increase in the total credit risk on derivatives. The credit risk on interest swaps remained relatively stable and amounted to EUR 1.2 billion, while the credit risk on foreign currency swaps more than doubled from almost EUR 0.5 billion at the end of 2009 to more than EUR 1.0 billion at the end of 2010. The main reason for this increase was the reduction in exchange rates in 2010. In the context of its EMTN issues, the Treasury also concluded some new foreign currency swaps in 2010. Finally, the credit risk on other derivative products[5] also increased, from EUR -19.3 million at the end of 2009 to EUR -37.5 million at the end of 2010.

The share of net credit risk on derivative products with counterparts with an AA rating continued to fall, dropping from 18% at the end of 2009 to 6% at the end of 2010. The share of net credit risk on derivative products with counterparts with an A rating increased during the same period, from 82% to 94%.

(2) The Treasury only accepts counterparts that have a minimum A-/A3 rating.
(3) See the Federal government 2007 Annual Debt Report, Part 3, point 3 for an explanation of the EMA master agreements.
(4) A new “Credit Support Annex” (CSA) agreement was concluded in 2010 with the sole primary dealer who had not yet signed an agreement.
(5) FXSwaps and outrights

G25. Share of placements - reverse repos
Average daily amounts placed in EUR (in millions)



G26. Monthly change in the share of placements – reverse repos,
Average daily amounts placed in EUR (in millions)



T6. Credit exposure for derivatives by rating level at the end of December 2010

Ratings (*)	Number of transactions	%	Total exposure in EUR befort collateral	%	Collateral	Total exposure in EUR	%
AAA	0	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	-	0.0%
AA	26	14.6%	231 371 231.97	10.3%	185 510 000.00	45 861 231.97	5.9%
A	152	85.4%	2 006 342 481.59	89.7%	1 272 530 000.00	733 812 481.59	94.1%
Total	**178**	**100.0%**	**2 237 713 713.56**	**100.0%**	**1 458 040 000.00**	**779 673 716.56**	**100.0%**

(*) Rating of the counterpart or parent company.

T7. Credit exposure for derivatives by rating level and by product at the end of December 2010

Ratings (*)	Interest rate swaps	%	Foreign cuurency swaps	%	Other derivatives	%
AAA	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%
AA	9 309 020.18	0.7%	222 062 211.79	21.6%	-	0.0%
A	1 235 769 179.00	99.3%	808 089 077.39	78.4%	-37 515 774.80	100.0%
Total	**1 245 078 199.18**	**100.0%**	**1 030 151 289.18**	**100.0%**	**-37 515 774.80**	**100.0%**

(*) Rating of the counterpart or parent company.

T8. Distribution of credit exposure for derivative products by residual maturity at the end of December 2010

	Total	Interest rate swaps	Foreign cuurency swaps	Other derivatives
< 1 year	24.0%	46.4%	-0.2%	100.0%
1 to 5 years	25.1%	-1.7%	56.5%	0.0%
6 to 10 years	31.0%	31.9%	28.7%	0.0%
> = 10 years	19.9%	23.3%	15.1%	0.0%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

PART 3

BELGIAN DEBT AGENCY

PART 3. MAIN STRATEGIC POINTS

1. The sovereign debt crisis

1.1. Financing of Ireland and Greece

Financing of Greece

During the first weeks of 2010, it appeared that a eurozone country, i.e. Greece, was in imminent danger of being excluded from financing on the international markets. Like many other countries, Greece had to cope with a recession in 2009. Its negative growth, at -2.0%, was not exceptional in the European context – many countries' economies suffered more severe contraction – but Greece had always had very high growth figures up until 2007. The deterioration in the growth figures had a catastrophic effect on the budgetary results, which moreover turned out to be even worse than the Greek government's forecasts. The Greek 10-year rate, which at the beginning of 2009 had increased in a short space of time to more than 6% before falling back to around 4.5%, began to rise once more in November 2009, reaching 6.0% and beyond in January 2010.

The European Union, and particularly the eurozone countries, quickly began discussions on the possible assistance to be given to Greece. After months of debate, the solution agreed upon was the provision, for a period of three years, of a maximum of EUR 80 billion – in the form of loans – by the other eurozone countries. Each country would participate in this aid according to a distribution key based on their participation in the capital of the European Central Bank. The IMF would provide EUR 30 billion.

Greece received a first payment of EUR 14.5 billion on 18 May 2010. Belgium did not participate in this first payment, because the government had resigned and the necessary legislative work had been delayed. The law authorising the Finance Minister to grant loans to Greece of EUR 1.074 billion – with the possibility of further increasing this amount to EUR 2.0 billion – only came into effect on the date of its publication, 25 May 2010. In such cases, the other countries take responsibility for the financial aid due from the country that is unable to contribute, but that country must catch up on its arrears on the occasion of the next payment. Belgium therefore participated to a substantial extent in the payment of the second tranche of EUR 6.5 billion on 13 September, and the Kingdom paid EUR 754,960,466.65. This amount was also the only payment made in 2010 by Belgium, given that the payment of the third tranche envisaged for December was postponed until 2011 due to the local elections in Greece.

European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM)

It became apparent during April 2010 that the measures taken to assist Greece would not be sufficient. It was not only that the Greek rates increased – this time to levels never seen before – but the Portuguese and Irish rates also rose sharply at the end of the month. In the first days of May, this rise continued to such an extent that it was possible to speak of a sovereign debt crisis.

During the weekend of 8 and 9 May 2010, the European Council agreed on the establishment of a "European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism" with a volume of EUR 500 billion which would include, among other things, a "European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)". This EFSF would consist of a "Special Purpose Vehicle" with a volume of EUR 440 billion which would lend on the financial markets to assist those countries in difficulty with their financing. It would contract these loans with the Government guarantee of the different eurozone members.

In addition, the IMF again agreed to commit additional resources. The consequence of the announcement of this package of measures on the evening of Sunday 9 May was a substantial reduction in the rates for the countries in question on 10 May 2010. The creation of the EFSF was perfected over the following weeks and months. The company was incorporated under Luxembourg law, and after the vote on the law of 2 November 2010 and the related Royal Decree of

23 November, Belgium could take part, on 2 December, in the capital of this company. The maximum guarantee that Belgium could grant was set at EUR 15,292,180,000.

The Greek, Portuguese and Irish rates were, however, put under pressure again in the fourth quarter of 2010. On the one hand, there were declarations by some European political leaders at the end of October to the effect that a new definitive system would be implemented from 2013 (the EFSF would only remain operational for three years) and that the private creditors of governments would then have to make efforts to rescue the countries in difficulty. After this announcement, fears quickly arose on the financial markets regarding the possibility of sovereign debt restructuring. And on the other hand, it appeared that the total lending capacity of the EFSF did not amount to EUR 440 billion, but only to EUR 240 billion, given that the countries' guarantees would not otherwise be sufficient to maintain AAA status.

This uncertainty persisted until the end of March 2011; at its meeting on 25 March 2011, the European Council definitively ruled on the successor to the EFSF, the "European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM)". Meanwhile, Ireland had called for assistance from the EFSF and contracted its inaugural loan of EUR 5 billion on the financial markets on 25 January 2011, with good results. This enabled the lending of EUR 3.3 billion to Ireland on 1 February 2011.

1.2 Changes in yield spreads, swap spreads and CDS premiums; short selling

Rate spreads

At the end of 2009, the spreads compared with Germany and those compared with swaps ("asset swaps") had reduced considerably compared with the first quarter of 2009. Volatility nevertheless remained high due to uncertainty about the economic crisis, its impact on the budget deficit and the debt ratio, and the financial situation of the banks in the peripheral eurozone countries.

Combined with a substantial amount of sovereign issues, this uncertainly had a negative impact on the spreads for eurozone countries from the beginning of 2010. Belgium was also confronted by this situation: in January, at the time of the issue of a new 10-year benchmark bond (OLO 58), it was faced with an increase in asset swap spreads in the order of 20 basis points. But while the peripheral countries' spreads continuously increased, those for Belgium fell by more than 20 basis points. It was in this positive climate that the Debt Agency again launched two syndications in the market: a 5-year bond (OLO 59) and a very successful 30-year issue (OLO 60). Belgium thus distinguished itself from the peripheral countries.

The problems confronting Greece worsened in April, and the danger of a possible dislocation of the eurozone generated very substantial spread volatility for all the countries of the eurozone. This phenomenon was particularly noticeable in countries without an AAA rating, including Belgium. During this period, the 10-year OLO spread compared with Germany increased to a level of 110 basis points, a level never seen since the introduction of the euro. The creation of the EFSF by the Ministers of the eurozone did not have a direct impact, and it was not until the beginning of July that Belgian spreads would manage to break free of the trend prevailing in the peripheral countries. The uncertainties generated by the Parliamentary elections and the two auctions in June also resulted in pressure on Belgian spreads.

At the end of June, Belgium had already carried out 70% of its OLO issue programme, so that the Treasury was able to ease the pressure over the summer holidays by limiting itself to small auctions. The months of July and August were notably calmer, and the asset swap spreads and the spreads compared with Germany were practically halved from the peak reached in the month of June. Moreover, the uncertainties about the performance of the eurozone caused a spectacular fall in absolute yields. Combined with the reduction in spreads compared with Germany and the reduction in the 10-year rate, the Treasury was able to issue, in the August auction, a 10-year OLO at an extremely low record rate of 2.93% and a spread of 57 basis points compared with Germany.

Towards the end of September, however, the sluggishness of the negotiations to form a government began to have an impact. International investors became impatient, and this resulted in an increase in spreads compared with Germany of up to around 80 basis points. The spreads subsequently remained at this level until the beginning of December. This did not prevent the Debt Agency from relatively easily carrying out additional prefinancing for 2011 during the three auctions in the months of September, October and November.

When it became apparent at the start of November that Ireland would also have to seek assistance, Belgium was relegated to the least liquid end-of-year markets. By mid-December, the 10-year spread compared with Germany had reached a peak of 135 basis points. The uncertainties around the formation of a government certainly played a role, because it was already clear that there would be growth of 2% in the Belgian economy and that the budget deficit would be better than the 4.8% forecast at the beginning of 2010.

In January 2001, the markets were again more attentive to the better fundamentals of our country, and the spreads began to fall. They have, however, remained high and not at all reflective of Belgium's good economic performance.

CDC

An analysis of the CDS (Credit Default Swaps) shows that, in general, the variations in the CDS were in the same direction as those of the asset swap spreads. Given that CDS are illiquid instruments, differences may occur between the two at certain times and for some weeks. This was particularly the case in May, when the asset swap spreads reacted positively to the creation of the EFSF, while the trend in the CDS indicated a more wait-and-see attitude. The reverse ratio in October and November could also have been the consequence of tensions on the cash markets due to the auctions. The opposing trends of these two spreads in December was also less representative, given that both the cash markets and the CDS markets were then very illiquid.

Short selling

On 15 September 2010, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps (CDS). The objective was to create a harmonised regulatory framework for short selling throughout Europe. This Regulation should contribute to reducing the risks of transparency deficiencies, negative price spirals and regulatory defects encountered during the financial crisis and, more recently, in the context of volatility on the market for sovereign debt denominated in euros.

G27. Changes in CDC and 10-year Asset Swap Spreads (in basis points)



The Commission nevertheless acknowledged that short selling contributes to market liquidity and efficient price formation.

The Commission's proposal covers sovereign debt securities and credit default swaps (CDS). The proposal is not aimed at permanently prohibiting uncovered CDS positions (e.g. when a buyer uses a CDS not to cover a risk but to take a position), given that this could have a negative effect on the liquidity of the sovereign debt securities market. The objective is, in fact, to ensure greater transparency so that investors holding substantial uncovered CDS positions in relation to sovereign issuers must notify these positions to the regulators, who can then verify whether such positions are destabilising the markets, creating systemic risks or being used for improper purposes. In exceptional circumstances, the regulators will have the authority to obtain information on specific CDS transactions and provisionally prohibit or restrict the use of CDS.

The proposal also provides for what is known as a "location" rule. This rule determines that an investor who carries out a short selling transaction on shares or sovereign debt securities must, at the time of the sale, have borrowed (or have arranged to borrow) the instruments that it wishes to sell. The settlement platforms must also provide for appropriate procedures for the repurchase of shares. Fines will be provided for in the event of any settlement failure.

Transactions carried out on the primary market and in the context of market-making do not fall under the transparency and location requirements. They are not, however, exempted from the repurchase procedures or any measures that the regulators may take in exceptional circumstances.

The Commission proposal is being examined by the Council and the European Parliament. It is clear, however, that further discussions will be necessary given that, at this stage, there is no basis for an agreement. Some countries are requesting that any reference to CDS transactions in relation to sovereign debt securities be withdrawn from the proposal, along with any reference to the sovereign debt securities themselves, since they consider that this matter falls within the scope of their budgetary policy. They also fear that this will increase their financing costs, and insist that the ESMA cannot take measures in relation to the sovereign debt of a given Government without the latter's prior consent. Once adopted, the Regulation should come into effect on 1 July 2012.

1.3 Distribution of Belgian federal debt

The primary market

The OLO primary market[1]

With regard to the OLO primary market, overall demand from eurozone investors (Belgium and other eurozone countries) increased slightly, reaching 55% of the total placed. However, a reduction was seen in demand from Belgian investors (12% of the total amount placed, compared with 20% in 2009), in contrast with the strong increase in demand from these investors on the secondary market. The substantial demand from the eurozone for the new 10-year benchmark should also be noted (67% of the amount placed, of which three-quarters on behalf of investors from other eurozone countries).

It can also be seen that the interest of the Asian countries (9.92% of the amount placed) and the United States (1.46% of the amount placed) recovered a little after the substantial fall in 2009. There was particularly strong demand from Asia (22.4% of the amount placed) for the new 5-year benchmark (OLO 59). Demand for this type of maturity has traditionally been strong from Asian central banks.

The demand from other European countries outside the eurozone fell slightly (to 33.6% of the amount placed). It should be noted that there was substantial demand (46.5% of the capital placed) from this region for the new 30-year benchmark (OLO 60), with the main impulse coming from the United Kingdom (35.7% of the capital placed).

(1) The conclusions are based solely on data transmitted to the Treasury by the joint managers and co-lead managers in the context of the syndicated issues. The Treasury does not have this type of data for the auctioned issues.

With regard to the type of investors, there was a general reduction in demand in 2010 from commercial banks (41% of the amount placed). There was also a fall in demand from central banks and other public institutions (12% of the amount placed), but their interest in a new 5-year benchmark (OLO 59) remained substantial, as is generally the case.

G28. Geographical distribution of the amount placed in 2010



G.29. Geographical distribution of the amount placed over the last three years



Additionally, the strong increase in the interest shown by pension funds (6% of the amount placed) and insurance companies (13% of the amount placed) is notable. These two categories have been more systematically present in syndications since 2009. Given that liquidity is lower on the secondary market, they choose the primary market when they want to acquire large amounts. The Treasury also issued two long-term OLOs (10 and 30 years) in 2010, which traditionally enjoy good success with this investor category.

G30. Distribution by investor type of the amount placed in 2010



G.31. Distribution by investor type of the amount placed over the last three years



The demand from fund managers increased once again (29% of the capital placed), after a substantial fall in 2009.

These three latter categories of investors showed a particularly keen interest in the new 10-year (OLO 58) and 30-year (OLO 60) benchmarks.

The Treasury certificates primary market

Issues of Treasury certificates are carried out only via the auction technique, in which the primary and recognized dealers take paper on their own behalf and on behalf of investors. Consequently, the Treasury does not have any data at its disposal to allow it to determine the type of investors or the geographical zone of the placements.

The secondary market

First of all, it should be noted that the following conclusions are based solely on figures obtained from the primary and recognized dealers. They constitute the Treasury's main placing bodies, although there are others. Nevertheless, the figures make it possible to identify certain trends. It should also be noted that this relates only to purchases/sales by final investors, and therefore not the interdealer market.

The OLO secondary market

The volume traded on the OLO secondary market increased by 17% in 2010. Net OLO purchases by investors fell by 5%.

It will be noted that there was a clear increase in net purchases by Belgian investors (+175%), to the detriment of net purchases from investors in other eurozone countries (-70%). This indicates that despite the difficulties in the market and the increase in spreads compared with Germany, these investors maintained their confidence in the federal government debt. In addition, it should also be noted that investors from some southern European countries sold OLOs, no doubt to the benefit of their own countries' Government securities.

G32. Volume traded on the OLO secondary market (in millions of EUR)



G33. Changes in net purchases on the OLO secondary market (in millions of EUR)



Asian investors displayed less interest in OLOs on the secondary market (72% drop in net purchases), but investors in the region nevertheless remained net OLO buyers.

European investors outside the eurozone were still net OLO sellers in 2008 and 2009. Their OLO position was more neutral in 2010. The selling pressure from the United States, however, increased again in 2010.

Net purchases by commercial banks (-38%) and private investors (-53%) fell markedly. The same was true of central banks (-14%), although to a lesser degree.

Pension funds (+55%), insurance companies (+44%), fund managers (+17%) and companies (+124%) purchased significantly more than in 2009. This corresponds to the trend observed on the primary market.

Hedge funds remained net OLO sellers.

G34. Changes in net OLO purchases by region (in millions of EUR)



G35. Changes in net OLO purchases by investor type (in millions of EUR)



The Treasury certificates secondary market

The volume of Treasury certificates traded on the secondary market increased by 2%.

Net Treasury Certificate purchases fell by 20%.

In net terms, the primary dealers sold less in Belgium (-37%), in the other eurozone countries (-8%) and in other European countries outside the eurozone (-19%). The strong increase in net purchases by Asian and (+78%) and American (+22%) investors is particularly noteworthy, since there had already been a substantial increase in these figures in the previous year.

G36. Volume of Treasury certificates traded on the secondary market (in millions of EUR)



G37. Changes in net purchases of Treasury certificates on the secondary market (in millions of EUR)



Net purchases were down for all investor types (commercial banks (-18%), central banks (-10%), pension funds (-41%), insurance companies (-17%), fund managers (-37%), hedge funds (-27%) and companies (-19%).

Only net purchases by private investors increased by 4%.

G38. Changes in net purchases of Treasury Certificates by region (in millions of EUR)



G39. Changes in net purchases of Treasury certificates by investor type (in millions of EUR)



G40. Changes in OLO holdings (in % of total)



G41. Changes in Treasury Certificate holdings (in % of total)



Holdings of OLOs and Treasury Certificates

Holdings of OLOs by foreign investors fell slightly in 2010. At the end of December 2010, 52.6% of the outstanding amount was in the hands of foreign investors.

With regard to Treasury certificates, the trend towards greater internationalisation continued in 2010. At the end of December in the year under review, 90.9% of Treasury certificates were held by foreign investors.

2. Fedcom: Implementation of the double-entry general ledger accounting system for Belgian Federal State debt.

The law of 22 May 2003 on the organisation of the Federal government's budget and accounting system establishes the principle and specifies basic procedures for the parallel keeping of double-entry general ledger accounting and budget accounting, these two accounting systems being defined in terms of accruals and referring to a specific standardised chart of accounts. Managed by an inter-ministerial working group, the reform of the Federal government's accounting, known as the FEDCOM reform, is gradually being put in place in the various Federal Public Services (F.P.S.). This important reform will apply from 1 January 2001 to the F.P.S. Finance departments, including the Treasury and the Federal State Debt Service.

The Debt Service has been actively preparing for several years for the changeover to the new accounting system. The contract for acquiring the accounting software and the consulting services necessary to put it into operation was signed in December 2007, but the groundwork had been carried out well beforehand with regard to the inventory of accounting entries and the analysis work to define the accounting rules for each product and each operation. The work required to configure these rules in the IT systems began in January 2008 and was completed during 2010, when the new system was put into operation.

For debt financing and management operations, the new accounting system is based above all on the high potential for automation in the generation of accounting entries. In fact, the accounting software is an integral part of the Debt Service database, guaranteeing an uninterrupted process between the inputting of operations in the front office and the insertion of the relevant entries in the accounts. All debt financing and management operations are therefore entered into the database by the front office, and are validated in this same database by the back office during the transaction confirmation phase. Validation by the back office triggers the generation of the double-entry accounting entries in the accounting module. The accounting entries are then checked and validated by the accounting service. The bank statement is the essential document for these checks when the operations give rise to a financial settlement.

The basic debt accounting approach is the double-entry general ledger accounting system. Budget accounting is derived from general accounting through defined links between certain general accounting accounts and the headings of the budget. The accounting year is broken down into monthly accounting periods. At the end of each monthly period and a fortiori at the end of the financial year, the accounting postings are transferred using the “FEDCOM” system interface.

The general ledger double-entry accounting system currently in place at the Debt Service refers to the law of 17th July 1975 on corporate accounting, and also takes account of specific factors relating to governments and to the international regulatory frameworks that govern national accounts. The Debt Service will therefore produce a set of accounts in a form similar to that stipulated by the provisions for corporate accounting, and will draw up a balance sheet and income statement that will eventually be integrated into the Federal government's overall accounting statements. However, the Federal government's standardised chart of accounts differs in several respects from the corporate chart of accounts, and the allocation rules for the new public accounting system are broadly in line with the standards of the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts in its 1995 version (ESA 95) and with the rules defined within the framework of application of the protocol for the procedure concerning excessive deficits, attached as an annex to the treaty establishing the European Community.

APPENDICES

Maturity dates of the Federal Government Debt in billions of EUR



Average weighted actuarial rate of the Treasury's debt in EUR (in %)



Amounts in circulation by OLO line (EUR) at end December 2010

MATURITY	COUPON %	CODE	OLO No.	AMOUNT IN CIRCULATION	STRIPS %
28-03-2011	3.5	313222	53	10 988 000 000.00	0.10%
22-06-2011	FRN	311200	51	3 000 000 000.00	
28-09-2011	5	296 054	36	12 390 400 000.00	0.45%
28-03-2012	2	317264	57	7 443 000 000.00	0.00%
28-09-2012	5	298 076	38	12 757 900 000.00	1.56%
24-12-2012	8	262 684	12	8 546 896 081.1	
28-03-2013	4	310194	50	12 718 000 000.00	0.49%
28-09-2013	4.25	301 102	41	13 727 200 000.00	2.03%
28-03-2014	4	314238	54	10 973 000 000.00	0.28%
28-09-2014	4.25	303 124	43	12 828 915 000.00	1.59%
28-03-2015	8	282 880	23	6 220 187 157.66	4.32%
28-03-2015	3.5	316258	56	9 785 000 000.00	0.07%
28-09-2015	3.75	306150	46	11 294 000 000.00	3.76%
28-03-2016	2.75	319286	59	9 594 000 000.00	0.00%
28-09-2016	3.25	307166	47	12 175 000 000.00	0.46%
28-03-2017	4	309188	49	11 176 000 000.00	0.51%
28-09-2017	5.5	300 096	40	8 437 637 800.00	3.18%
28-03-2018	4	312 216	52	10 103 000 000.00	0.06%
28-03-2019	4	315243	55	10 212 000 000.00	0.00%
28-09-2020	3.75	318270	58	17 634 000 000.00	0.04%
28-03-2022	4	308 172	48	12 827 000 000.00	0.68%
28-03-2028	5.5	291 972	31	14 131 939 136.01	18.03%
28-03-2035	5	304 130	44	14 017 692 800.00	13.69%
28-03-2041	4.25	320 292	60	4 823 000 000.00	17.63%
TOTAL				**257 803 767 974.83**	
Strippable lines in circulation:				**246 256 871 893.67**	

OLO auction and syndication results in 2010 (EUR million)

Issue type	Issue date	Final maturity date	ISIN BE0000	Amount in circulation before issue	Amount bid	Amount accepted (Comp)	Exerc. non comp	Total accepted	Bid to cover	Weighted average price	Weighted average rate	Min/max bid	Stop price	Success-ful bidders
SYNDICATION	19-01-2010	28-09-2020	318270			5 000.0		5 000.0		99.032	3.864			
								5 000.0						
AUCTION	22-02-2010	28-03-2015	316258	8 601.0	3 085.0	925.0	259.0	1 184.0	3.34	104.473	2.550	104.00/104.54	104.44	10
		28-09-2020	318270	5 000.0	2 780.0	1 540.0	411.0	1 951.0	1.81	99.943	3.758	99.60/100.08	99.90	16
		28-03-2022	308172	10 355.0	1 770.0	1 030.0	280.0	1 310.0	1.72	101.364	3.856	100.70/101.51	101.29	12
					7 635.0	**3 495.0**	**950.0**	**4 445.0**						
SYNDICATION	16-03-2010	28-03-2016	319286			4 000.0		4 000.0		99.840	2.778			
								4 000.0						
SYNDICATION	21-04-2010	28-03-2041	320292			4 000.0		4 000.0		99.615	4.272			
						4 000.0		**4 000.0**						
AUCTION	07-06-2010	28-03-2012	317264	6 457.0	2 690.0	857.0	129.0	986.0	3.14	101.900	0.928	101.51/101.96	101.85	12
		28-03-2016	319286	4 000.0	1 360.0	950.0	217.0	1 167.0	1.43	99.545	2.835	99.09/99.87	99.40	13
		28-09-2020	318270	6 951.0	1 900.0	1 360.0	436.0	1 796.0	1.40	101.930	3.523	101.22/102.13	101.80	14
					5.950.0	**3 167.0**	**782.0**	**3 949.0**						
AUCTION	28-06-2010	28-03-2013	310194	11 057.0	2 275.0	708.0	240.0	948.0	3.21	106.892	1.416	106.50/106.92	106.85	5
		28-03-2016	319286	5 167.0	2 275.0	1 105.0	312.0	1 417.0	2.06	99.820	2.786	99.40/99.91	99.80	6
		28-09-2020	318270	8 747.0	2 450.0	1 400.0	420.0	1 820.0	1.75	101.509	3.571	100.75/101.58	101.35	10
		28-03-2028	291972	13 439.9	1 248.0	468.0	224.0	692.0	2.67	118.051	4.052	117.29/118.11	118.0	5
					8 248.0	**3 681.0**	**1 196.0**	**4 877.0**						
AUCTION	26-07-2010	28-03-2016	319286	6 584.0	1 980.0	1 006.0	327.0	1 333.0	1.97	100.851	2.585	100.50/100.98	100.80	13
		28-09-2020	318270	10 567.0	2 430.0	1 310.0	356.0	1 660.0	1.85	103.587	3.328	103.20/103.79	103.51	13
					4 410.0	**2 316.0**	**683.0**	**2 999.0**						
AUCTION	23-08-2010	28-03-2013	310194	12 005.0	2 410.0	710.0	3.0	713.0	3.39	107.798	0.933	107.43/107.88	107.79	6
		28-09-2020	318270	1 233.0	2 020.0	1 095.0	365.0	1 460.0	1.84	107.081	2.929	106.75/107.16	107.02	13
		28-03-2022	308172	11 665.0	1 735.0	945.0	217.0	1 162.0	1.84	109.181	3.046	108.50/109.30	109.06	14
					6 165.0	**2 750.0**	**585.0**	**3 335.0**						
AUCTION	27-09-2010	28-03-2016	319286	7 917.0	2 060.0	765.0	107.0	872.0	2.69	102.171	2.322	101.70/102.26	102.10	10
		28-09-2020	318270	13 693.0	2 392.0	937.0	792.0	1 729.0	2.55	105.192	3.137	104.68/105.30	105.12	10
		28-03-2041	320292	4 000.0	1 055.0	590.0	233.0	823.0	1.79	108.091	3.797	107.23/108.21	108.01	14
					5 507.0	**2 292.0**	**1 132.0**	**3 242.0**						
AUCTION	25-10-2010	28-09-2013	301102	12 975.2	2 350.0	752.0	0.0	752.0	3.09	107.496	1.599	107.15/107.57	107.47	11
		28-03-2016	319286	8 789.0	2 250.0	805.0	0.0	805.0	2.80	101.227	2.503	100.75/101.32	101.46	11
		28-09-2020	318270	15 422.0	2 850.0	1 190.0	17.0	1 207.0	2.39	104.090	3.260	103.50/104.23	104.02	13
					7 425.0	**2 747.0**	**17.0**	**2 764.0**						
AUCTUION	29-11-2010	28-09-2014	303124	12 208.9	1 110.0	620.0	0.0	620.0	1.79	107.096	2.288	106.75/107.23	107.00	11
		28-09-2020	318270	16 629.0	1 660.0	945.0	60.0	1 005.0	1.76	100.251	3.718	99.73/100.40	100.10	12
		28-03-2035	304130	13 583.6	780.0	435.0	0.0	435.0	1.79	112.729	4.157	112.00/113.07	112.50	10
					3 550.0	**2 000.0**	**60.0**	**2 060.0**						

Monthly breakdown of short-term debt components (EUR million)

Month	Postal account (1)	Interbank + misc. (2)	Treasury certificates (3) 1 month	2 months	3 months	6 months	12 months	Total TC	Treasury Bonds in EUR	Cash management transactions (4)	Total floating debt (5)
J09	909.0	4 086.0			8 516.4	13 447.5	22 496.6	44 460.5	2 627.1	13 075.7	39 006.7
F	1 034.4	3 845.2			9 180.0	15 778.9	22 826.7	47 785.6	1 128.5	14 680.0	39 113.6
M	1 062.3	7 710.2			11 865.5	16 539.7	23 347.7	51 752.9	1 166.2	2 715.2	58 976.3
A	1 120.6	4 191.2			13 184.0	17 011.7	23 833.0	54 028.7	1 387.6	7 199.6	53 528.5
M	868.7	3 378.5			11 962.8	16 461.8	24 593.0	53 017.6	908.8	3 235.4	54 938.2
J	1 214.6	4 707.4			10 575.9	14 486.9	24 979.4	50 042.2	1 036.3	4 845.4	52 155.2
J	1 083.2	3 268.9			9 787.0	13 472.0	25 505.6	48 764.6	495.4	5 787.7	47 824.4
A	1 092.3	4 973.5			8 447.2	13 535.4	26 369.3	48 351.8	1 263.4	8 371.6	47 309.4
S	1 123.3	6 369.4			9 052.3	11 255.9	25 910.3	46 218.5	1 489.7	4 082.1	51 118.8
O	1 269.6	3 108.5			7 288.3	11 171.3	25 947.5	44 407.1	1 879.9	5 720.3	44 944.9
N	1 120.2	6 401.5			5 971.7	10 233.6	25 905.9	42 111.3	2 617.5	6 098.4	46 152.0
D	1 229.0	5 408.0			3 939.6	10 074.9	26 122.3	40 136.9	458.4	6 307.6	40 924.7
J10	1 623.6	3 980.5			4 074.4	11 726.2	25 997.1	41 797.6	347.5	9 893.1	37 856.2
F	1 504.0	4 096.5			6 725.1	10 250.5	26 213.8	43 189.4	1 290.7	14 349.4	35 731.3
M	1 599.0	5 472.0			8 017.5	10 112.5	26 200.5	44 330.5	282.3	6 257.5	45 426.2
A	1 366.5	5 432.3			7 328.1	9 961.8	26 400.8	43 690.8	344.9	11 226.8	39 607.7
M	1 316.4	6 664.9			6 668.9	9 918.4	26 362.2	42 949.5	457.3	10 050.3	41 337.8
J	58.9	11 242.4			5 178.2	9 532.0	26 060.2	40 770.5	282.4	15 233.5	37 120.6
J	171.4	6 751.2			4 114.8	9 584.8	25 690.6	39 390.2	282.4	21 158.5	25 436.7
A	214.7	7 575.7			4 157.8	9 392.0	25 389.0	38 938.8	362.4	24 922.8	22 168.8
S	126.6	7 884.2			4 640.8	9 455.2	25 383.5	39 479.5	1 112.1	8 461.6	40 140.7
O	123.9	4 546.8			5 267.2	9 375.3	25 468.4	40 110.9	2 380.1	11 776.8	35 384.9
N	153.3	6 995.2			5 586.6	9 260.9	25 486.5	40 334.0	1 867.3	10 304.7	39 045.1
D	21.1	7 679.2			6 658.1	8 667.0	25 079.7	40 404.8	1 691.6	14 869.0	34 927.6

(1) private depositors' holdings in postal accounts

(2) interbank borrowing and lending

(3) certificates issued by auction after the 29/01/91 reform.
The amount indicated represents the NET amount outstanding collected by the Treasury. i.e. less any discounted interest and repayments during the reporting month.

(4) transactions performed to balance the daily cash flow.
Cash surplus from tax revenue or from Treasury-certificate issues.

(5) total floating debt with (4) deducted.

Note: Rounding may cause the totals to differ slightly from the sum of the constituent items taken from the monthly government debt statements.

Treasury-certificate auction and syndication results in 2010 (EUR million)

Auct. date	Amount at maturity	Maturity date	ISIN BE0312	Month	Amount in circul. before auc.	Amount bid	Amount accepted (comp)	Exerc. non comp.	Total accepted	Bid to cover	Weighted average rate	Euribor spread	Min/Max bid	Limit rate	Success-ful bidders
05-01-2010		15-04-2010	654230	3	4 137.0	5 885.0	1 307.0	178.0	1 485.0	4.50	0.339	-36.00	0.330/0.390	0.340	12
		17-06-2010	656250	6	2 317.0	7 410.0	1 918.0	375.0	2 293.0	3.86	0.435	-56.00	0.430/0.500	0.440	15
12-01-2010	5 651.0	15-04-2010	654230	3	5 622.0	4 610.0	1 306.0	82.0	1 388.0	3.53	0.301	-38.40	0.295/0.350	0.305	11
		20-01-2011	663322	12	0.0	5 020.0	2 003.0	124.0	2 127.0	2.51	0.722	-51.40	0.710/0.770	0.730	16
02-02-2010		20-05-2010	655245	3	4 469.0	3 615.0	1 311.0	0.0	1 311.0	2.76	0.284	-38.10	0.275/0.350	0.290	13
		15-07-2010	657266	6	2 233.0	5 505.0	1 908.0	0.0	1 908.0	2.89	0.381	-58.60	0.370/0.430	0.385	15
16-02-2010	5 360.0	20-05-2010	655245	3	5 780.0	4 995.0	1 206.0	110.0	1 316.0	4.14	0.296	-36.70	0.290/0.400	0.300	14
		17-02-2011	664338	12	0.0	4 210.0	2 207.0	0.0	2 207.0	1.91	0.617	-60.70	0.610/0.700	0.625	13
02-03-2010		17-06-2010	656250	3	4 610.0	3 730.0	1 305.0	0.0	1 305.0	2.86	0.291	-36.40	0.270/0.400	0.295	12
		19-08-2010	658272	6	2 449.0	4 232.0	1 897.0	0.0	1 897.0	2.23	0.372	-58.60	0.360/0.450	0.375	11
16-03-2010	5 435.0	17-06-2010	656250	3	5 915.0	3 940.0	1 207.0	12.0	1 219.0	3.26	0.285	-36.10	0.270/0.320	0.290	12
		17-03-2011	665343	12	0.0	4 540.0	2 005.0	141.0	2 146.0	2.26	0.658	-55.90	0.650/0.700	0.660	16
30-03-2010		15-07-2010	657266	3	4 141.0	3 235.0	1 006.0	20.0	1 026.0	3.22	0.308	-32.70	0.305/0.350	0.310	11
		16-09-2010	659288	6	2 010.0	2 730.0	1 835.0	0.0	1 835.0	1.49	0.375	-56.90	0.365/0.450	0.380	13
13-04-2010	7 010.0	15-07-2010	657266	3	5 167.0	4 185.0	1 002.0	155.0	1 157.0	4.18	0.314	-33.00	0.305/0.360	0.315	10
		14-04-2011	666358	12	0.0	3 735.0	2 005.0	339.0	2 344.0	1.86	0.677	-54.90	0.670/0.710	0.680	13
04-05-2010		19-08-2010	658272	3	4 346.0	2 765.0	870.0	46.0	916.0	3.18	0.304	-36.40	0.300/0.400	0.305	7
		14-10-2010	660294	6	1 920.0	3 085.0	1 895.0	108.0	2 003.0	1.63	0.381	-59.30	0.375/0.450	0.385	10
18-05-2010	7 096.0	19-08-2010	658272	3	5 262.0	3 165.0	905.0	146.0	1 051.0	3.50	0.186	-50.20	0.180/0.250	0.190	10
		19-05-2011	667364	12	0.0	3 170.0	2 010.0	364.0	2 374.0	1.58	0.631	-61.60	0.620/0.680	0.640	15
01-06-2010		16-09-2010	659288	3	3 845.0	3 335.0	506.0	0.0	506.0	6.59	0.163	-53.90	0.155/0.220	0.165	10
		18-11-2010	661300	6	2 135.0	4 000.0	1 904.0	0.0	1 904.0	2.10	0.208	-78.30	0.195/0.250	0.215	14
15-06-2010	7 134.0	16-09-2010	659288	3	4 351.0	3 090.0	503.0	23.0	526.0	6.14	0.286	-43.70	0.280/0.350	0.290	9
		16-06-2011	668370	12	0.0	4 510.0	2 005.0	0.0	2 005.0	2.25	0.624	-65.20	0.620/0.740	0.630	12

Auct. date	Amount at maturity	Maturity date	ISIN BE0312	Month	Amount in circul. before auc.	Amount bid	Amount accepted (comp)	Exerc. non comp.	Total accepted	Bid to cover	Weighted average rate	Euribor spread	Min/Max bid	Limit rate	Success-ful bidders
29-06-2010		14-10-2010	660294	3	3 923.0	1 705.0	565.0	20.0	585.0	3.02	0.378	-38.30	0.375/0.420	0.380	10
		16-12-2010	662316	6	2 301.0	2 840.0	1 890.0	72.0	1 962.0	1.50	0.490	-54.90	0.485/0.530	0.495	14
13-07-2010	6 324.0	14-10-2010	660294	3	4 508.0	2 125.0	506.0	28.0	534.0	4.20	0.446	-38.90	0.430/0.550	0.450	11
		14-07-2011	669386	12	0.0	2 750.0	1 860.0	0.0	1 860.0	1.48	0.715	-64.30	0.675/0.780	0.725	16
03-08-2010		18-11-2010	661300	3	4 039.0	3 040.0	1 005.0	0.0	1 005.0	3.02	0.416	-48.30	0.410/0.520	0.420	11
		20-01-2011	663322	6	2 127.0	4 920.0	1 705.0	0.0	1 705.0	2.89	0.516	-63.00	0.510/0.620	0.520	11
17-08-2010	6 313.0	18-11-2010	661300	3	5 044.0	3 706.0	804.0	202.0	1 006.0	4.61	0.430	-46.50	0.425/0.500	0.435	9
		18-08-2011	670392	12	0.0	3 870.0	2 020.0	120.0	2 140.0	1.92	0.666	-75.50	0.655/0.750	0.670	15
31-08-2010		16-12-2010	662316	3	4 263.0	4 680.0	712.0	0.0	712.0	6.57	0.405	-48.10	0.400/0.520	0.410	7
		17-02-2011	664338	6	2 207.0	4 452.0	1 804.0	95.0	1 899.0	2.47	0.449	-68.80	0.440/0.550	0.455	12
14-09-2010	4 877.0	16-12-2010	662316	3	4 975.0	3 650.0	804.0	0.0	804.0	4.54	0.400	-47.70	0.395/0.520	0.405	10
		15-09-2011	671408	12	0.0	4 250.0	2 006.0	0.0	2 006.0	2.12	0.760	-65.90	0.750/0.840	0.765	14
05-10-2010		20-01-2011	663322	3	3 832.0	4 025.0	903.0	0.0	903.0	4.46	0.563	-39.30	0.560/0.640	0.565	9
		17-03-2011	665343	6	2 146.0	4 815.0	1 925.0	0.0	1 925.0	2.50	0.621	-57.00	0.610/0.700	0.625	11
12-10-2010	5 042.0	20-01-2011	663322	3	4 735.0	2 720.0	804.0	40.0	844.0	3.38	0.593	-38.90	0.585/0.700	0.595	10
		20-10-2011	672414	12	0.0	4 080.0	2 008.0	0.0	2 008.0	2.03	0.910	-56.50	0.900/1.010	0.915	15
02-11-2010		17-02-2011	664338	3	4 106.0	2 860.0	1 115.0	0.0	1 115.0	2.57	0.777	-27.00	0.770/0.850	0.780	15
		14-04-2011	666358	6	2 344.0	4 795.0	1 795.0	0.0	1 795.0	2.67	0.901	-36.90	0.895/0.970	0.905	11
16-11-2010	6 050	17-02-2011	664338	3	5 221.0	3 535.0	1 003.0	215.0	1 218.0	3.52	0.784	-26.20	0.760/0.900	0.795	8
		17-11-2011	673420	12	0.0	4 350.0	1 808.0	352.0	2 160.0	2.41	1.117	-42.80	1.080/1.190	1.125	16
30-11-2010		17-03-2011	665343	3	4 071.0	2 110.0	1 425.0	0.0	1 425.0	1.48	0.864	-16.40	0.800/1.050	0.900	12
		19-05-2011	667364	6	2 374.0	2 110.0	1 370.0	0.0	1 370.0	1.54	1.000	-26.00	0.940/1.200	1.045	14
14-12-2010	5 779	17-03-2011	665343	3	5 496.0	3 572.0	940.0	131.0	1 071.0	3.80	0.884	-14.20	0.850/1.100	0.895	5
		15-12-2011	674436	12	0.0	2 335.0	1 565.0	213.0	1 778.0	1.49	1.821	29.10	1.720/2.100	1.880	15

Amounts invested in "Treasury bonds – Silver Fund" statement at 31st December 2010

Treasury bond - Silver Fund	Amount Invested	Interest rates	Pro rata interest at 31/12/2010	Portfolio at 31/12/2010	Amount at final maturity
10/04/2003 - 15/04/2011	451.511.336,23 (1)	4,23497214	170.773.414,69	622.284.750,92	629.682.696,99
21/11/2003 - 17/10/2011	645.687.591,81 (2)	4,24719380	222.475.231,36	868.162.823,17	897.230.872,37
21/11/2003 - 16/04/2012	1.000.000.000,00 (2)	4,31747266	351.020.718,02	1.351.020.718,02	1.426.757.473,64
21/11/2003 - 15/04/2013	1.000.000.000,00 (2)	4,44964500	363.252.095,83	1.363.252.095,83	1.506.014.320,05
22/01/2004 - 15/10/2012	296.159.365,37 (3)	4,22902667	98.761.289,84	394.920.655,21	425.297.020,86
22/01/2004 - 15/04/2014	1.000.000.000,00 (3)	4,37400828	346.414.290,70	1.346.414.290,70	1.549.902.169,97
22/01/2004 - 15/04/2015	1.000.000.000,00 (3)	4,45786790	353.948.427.21	1.353.948.427,21	1.632.358.619,37
22/01/2004 - 15/04/2016	1.000.000.000,00 (3)	4,56395979	363.531.648,92	1.363.531.648,92	1.726.649.079,02
22/01/2004 - 18/04/2017	1.000.000.000,00 (3)	4,67063142	373.225.723,33	1.373.225.723,33	1.830.675.165,94
22/01/2004 - 16/04/2018	1.000.000.000,00 (3)	4,74408188	379.934.980,42	1.379.934.980,42	1.934.933.570,10
03/12/2004 - 15/04/2019	1.250.000.000,00 (4)	4,20204082	355.597.342,14	1.605.597.342,14	2.258.592.546,19
03/12/2004 - 15/04/2020	1.250.000.000,00 (4)	4,24643832	359.762.670,71	1.609.762.670,71	2.369.231.756,61
20/05/2005 - 14/04/2021	442.653.633,07 (5)	3,76448399	102.211.074,12	544.864.707,19	797.041.035,55
28/12/2006 - 15/10/2021	555.628.202,07 (6)	4,01888850	95.201.747,85	650.829.949,92	995.830.949,11
27/04/2007 - 15/04/2021	176.663.398,98 (7)	4,32873520	29.857.424,95	206.520.823,93	319.446.696,28
29/07/2010 - 15/04/2022	955.744.555,41 (8)	3,64927838	14.753.834,65	970.498.390,06	1.454.746.084,10
28/10/2010 - 17/04/2023	619.003.211,29 (9)	3,64892851	3.963.325,52	622.966.536,81	968.034.074,05
Total in EUR	**13.643.051.294,23**		**3.984.685.240,26**	**17.627.736.534,49**	**22.722.424.130,20**

(1) Belgacom dividend (237,252,326.52); bank notes (213,965,560.02); short-term interest (293,449.69)
(2) Credibe (2,645,687,591.81)
(3) Belgacom pension fund (5,000,000,000.00); Belgacom dividend (290,000,021.25); short-term interest (6,159,344.12)
(4) Fadels (2,500,000,000.00)
(5) DLU (422,897,175.76); Credibe balance (19,754,399.06); short-term interest (2,058.25)
(6) BNB earnings (211,934,919.75); Belgacom dividend (317,056,955.21); DLU (150,737.04); Credibe balance (26,477,330.62); short-term interest (8,259.45),
(7) 2006 budget balance (176,000,000.00); short-term interest (663,398.98)
(8) Final maturity BT-FV 15 April 2010 (955,734,250.39); short-term interest (10,305.02)
(9) Final maturity BT-FV 15 October 2010 (618,936,159.87); short-term interest (67,051.42)

Organisation chart (31/12/2010)

General Treasury Department
Marc MONBALIU, Director-General

Silver Fund
Marc MONBALIU

Government Financing and Financial Markets
Marc MONBALIU

Public Debt Support Service

Auditor General of Finance
O. VAN DRIESSCHE

10th Division
Director
M. SEMPELS
Treasury position
Cash flow forecasts

11th Division
Director
F. ROUFOSSE
Accounts
Monthly debt position

12th et 13th Divisions
Director
P. RAEPSAET
Financial loans department
Printing
Government guaranteed bonds
Bonds issued by
Communities and Regions
Financial control of
public-sector enterprises

15th Division
Chief financial attaché
J. SMET
Ledgers
Stockholder registrations

Debt Agency

D1	D2	D3
Director A. LECLERCQ	Director J. DEBOUTTE	
Front office	**1. Risk management and strategy**	**1. Back office**
Assistant Manager S. DE SMEDT	Assistant Manager B. DEBERGH	Assistant Manager P. LEPOUTRE
	2. Investor Relations & Product Development	**2. Systems**
	Assistant Manager S. THEYS	Assistant Manager T. GEELS

Advisory Auditor
Erik ANNÉ

Financial Markets and Services
Auditor General
V. BUYDENS

BELGIAN DEBT AGENCY

List of Treasury Securities Dealers in the Kingdom of Belgium in 2011

Primary Dealers

ABN AMRO	Gustaf Mahlerlaan 10, PO Box 283, NL-1000 EA Amsterdam
BARCLAYS BANK PLC	5 North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, GB-London E14 4BB
BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV	Rue Montagne du Parc 3, B-1000-Bruxelles / Warandeberg 3, B-1000-Brussel
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS LTD	Citigroup Centre, 33 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, GB-London E14 5LB
CREDIT AGRICOLE CIB	Quai du Président Paul Doumer 9, F-92920-Paris La Défense Cédex
DEUTSCHE BANK AG	Grosse Gallusstrasse, 10/14, D-60262-Frankfurt
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL	Peterborough Court, 133 Fleet Street, GB-London EC4A 2BB
HSBC FRANCE	Avenue des Champs Elysées 103, F-75008-Paris
ING BANK NV	Amstelveenseweg 500, NL-1081 KL Amsterdam
JP MORGAN SECURITIES LTD	125 London Wall, GB-London-EC2Y 5AJ
KBC BANK NV	Havenlaan 12, B-1080-Brussel / Avenue du Port 12, B-1080-Bruxelles
MORGAN STANLEY & CO INT. PLC	25 Cabot Square - Canary Wharf, GB-LONDON-E14 4QW
NOMURA INTERNATIONAL PLC	One Angel Lane, GB-London EC4R 3AB
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA CAPITAL MARKETS	One Queenhithe, Thames Court, GB-London EC4V 4DE
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC	135 Bishopsgate, GB-London EC2M 3UR
SOCIETE GENERALE	Boulevard Haussmann 29, F-75009-Paris
UBS LIMITED	100 Liverpool Street, GB-London EC2M 2RH

Recognized Dealers

BANCO SANTANDER SA	Ciudad Grupo Santander, Avda. de Cantabria, s/n, E-28660-Boadilla del Monte (Madrid)
COMMERZBANK AG	Theodor-Heuss-Allee, 44/46, D-60486 Frankfurt
JEFFERIES INTERNATIONAL LTD	Vintners Place, 68 Upper Thames Street, GB-London-EC4V 3BJ
NORDEA BANK	Christiansbro, 3 Strandgade, DK-0900 Copenhagen

BTB Dealers

BNP PARIBAS FORTIS	Rue Montagne du Parc 3, B-1000-Bruxelles / Warandeberg 3, B-1000-Brussel
CITIBANK INTERNATIONAL PLC	Citigroup Centre, 33 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, GB-London E14 5LB
DEUTSCHE BANK AG (London Branch)	Winchester House, 1 Great Winchester Street, GB-London EC2N 2DB
DEXIA CAPITAL MARKETS	Boulevard Pacheco 44, B-1000-Bruxelles / Pachecolaan 44, B-1000-Brussel
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL (arranger)	Peterborough Court, 133 Fleet Street, GB-London EC4A 2BB
KBC BANK NV	Havenlaan 12, B-1080-Brussel / Avenue du port 12, B-1080-Bruxelles
UBS LIMITED	100 Liverpool Street, GB-London EC2M 2RH
BARCLAYS BANK PLC	1 Churchill Place, GB-London E14 5HP

State-note placement institutions in 2011

BANQUE DEGROOF	Rue de l'Industrie, 44	1040 Bruxelles
BANQUE DE LA POSTE	Boulevard Anspach, 1	1000 Bruxelles
BANQUE KBC	Havenlaan, 2	1080 Brussel
BKCP-CREDIT PROFESSIONNEL	Boulevard de Waterloo, 16	1000 Bruxelles
BNP PARIBAS FORTIS SA/NV	Montagne du Parc, 3	1000 Bruxelles
DEUTSCHE BANK	Avenue Marnix, 13-15	1000 Bruxelles
DEXIA BANQUE	Boulevard Pachéco, 44	1000 Bruxelles
DIERICKX, LEYS ET CIE	Kasteelpleinstraat, 44-46	2000 Antwerpen
GOLDWASSER EXCHANGE	Avenue Adolphe Demeur, 35	1060 Bruxelles
ING BELGIUM	Avenue Marnix, 24	1000 Bruxelles
LELEUX ASSOCIATED BROKERS	Rue du Bois Sauvage, 17	1000 Bruxelles
VAN DE PUT ET CIE	Van Putlei, 74-76	2018 Antwerpen
VDK SPAARBANK	Sint-Michielsplein, 16	9000 Gent

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